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The Missing Link Between Financial Constraints 
and Productivity 
 
Marialuz Moreno Badia and Veerle Slootmaekers
1 




This paper provides new evidence on the link between finance and firm-level 
productivity focusing on the case of Estonia. We contribute to the literature in two 
important respects: (1) we look explicitly at the role of financial constraints; and (2) we 
develop a methodology that corrects for the misspecification problems of previous 
studies. Our results indicate that young and highly indebted firms tend to be more 
financially constrained. Overall, a large number of firms shows some degree of financial 
constraints, with firms in the primary sector being the most constrained. More 
importantly, we find that financial constraints do not lower productivity for most sectors 
with the exception of R&D, where the dampening effect of financial constraints on 
productivity is remarkably large. These results are robust to a variety of sensitivity tests. 
 
JEL classification: D24, G32, O16, P27 
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1  Introduction 
A growing empirical evidence suggests there is a positive relationship between financial 
development and growth.
2 As in other countries in emerging Europe, Estonia’s income 
convergence to EU levels has actually been accompanied by rapid financial deepening. 
Although the precise channels through which finance affects growth are not yet well 
understood, the existing literature underscores that, by mitigating information and 
transactions costs, a well-developed financial system can influence saving rates, investment 
decisions, and productivity—which embodies technological innovation. This paper focuses 
on the link between access to finance, specifically financial constraints, and productivity 
given the central role of the latter for economic growth and development.
3  
 
On the theoretical side, several models have articulated the mechanisms by which the 
financial system may increase productivity. The main idea is that access to finance facilitates 
firms’ investment in long-duration and productivity-enhancing projects. These projects are 
more easily undertaken when there are liquid financial markets given that investors can sell 
their stake in the project if they need their savings before the project matures (see, for 
example, Levine, 1991; and Bencivenga et al., 1995). Also, financial markets can help by 
evaluating prospective entrepreneurs, mobilizing savings to finance the most promising 
investment projects, and diversifying the risks associated with these innovative activities 
(King and Levine, 1993a). In addition, perfect credit markets increase the propensity to 
engage in long-term productivity-enhancing investment by decreasing the level of liquidity 
risk involved in those investments (see Aghion et al., 2007a). It follows from these models 
that financial frictions will result in lower productivity. 
 
The objective of this paper is to examine whether financial constraints have indeed reduced 
firm-level productivity in Estonia. The case of Estonia is particularly interesting because, 
despite significant financial deepening and rapid credit growth, more than 60 percent of 
                                                       
2  See the surveys by Levine (1997, 2005) for a review of the theoretical and empirical literature.   
3  Access to finance can clearly affect capital accumulation. However, the literature has identified innovation 
and technological progress as the main drivers of growth over extended periods of time (see, for example, 
Solow, 1957). Moreno Badia (2007) also finds that most of Estonia’s income convergence with EU15 since the 
mid-1990s stems from closing the gap in total factor productivity.     3
corporate investment in Estonia is financed with internal funds.
4 Moreover, the 2006 
progress report on the implementation of the Lisbon Strategy argues that Estonia’s adoption 
of new technologies is hindered by insufficient access to capital.
5 This suggests that some 
firms may be constrained in their investment and input decisions, with a potentially 
detrimental impact on productivity relative to unconstrained firms.   
 
To identify the effect of financial constraints on firms’ productivity, we use a unique 
firm-level dataset covering the primary, manufacturing, and service sectors for the years 
1997 to 2005 and proceed in two steps. First, we construct a measure of financial constraints 
by building on the literature of investment sensitivity to internal finance. Since firms may 
transit from different financial states, we allow this measure to vary with a set of firm 
characteristics that, a priori, are considered to determine the ability of a firm to attract 
external finance. The advantage of this approach is that it allows us to capture differences in 
the degree of financial constraints across firms and time. Second, we estimate the impact of 
this measure on firm-level productivity. For comparison with previous studies, we first 
estimate two separate equations: (i) a production function equation following Levinsohn and 
Petrin (2003) to obtain firm-level productivity estimates; and (ii) a productivity equation 
whose main regressor is the measure of financial constraints.
6 This indirect approach has, 
however, two shortcomings: (1) while Levinsohn and Petrin assume firm productivity 
follows a first-order Markov process, the productivity equation in (ii) does not control for 
lagged productivity and thus suffers from serial correlation; and (2) firms observe their own 
financial constraints and may respond by adjusting their inputs, which biases the firm-level 
productivity estimates in (i). To address these problems, we develop an alternative structural 
approach similar to the one used in the trade literature where we estimate a production 
function equation that directly includes financial constraints as a regressor while allowing 
productivity to evolve as a first-order autoregressive process.
7 To control for the potential 
                                                       
4  This could be due to financial frictions but may also be explained by the fact that, since 2000, retained 
earnings are not taxed in Estonia.   
5  According to the same report, access to loans is hindered by many factors including, insufficient guarantees or 
own capital, short financial history or insufficient business plan, financial institutions’ disproportionally large 
costs of processing small-scale loans.   
6  A similar approach is used, for example, in Gatti and Love (2008). 
7  See, for example, Van Biesebroeck (2005), Amiti and Konings (2007), De Loecker (2007), and Fernandes 
(2007).   4
simultaneity bias between productivity shocks and financial frictions we consider the lag of 
the financial constraints measure and control for unobserved industry fixed characteristics.
8  
 
Our main findings are as follows. First, we show that the investment of both young and 
highly indebted firms is more sensitive to internal funds and, as expected, foreign firms tend 
to be less financially constrained than the average Estonian firm. Overall, a large number of 
firms displays some degree of financial constraints with firms in the primary sector being the 
most constrained. Second, the results from the indirect  approach suggest that financial 
constraints may have a negative impact on productivity. However, once we correct for the 
biases in this approach we find that financial constraints do not have an impact on 
productivity for most sectors with the exception of R&D, where the dampening effect of 
financial constraints on productivity is remarkably large. These findings are robust to several 
sensitivity tests.   
 
The empirical literature on the relationship between finance and productivity is scant, with 
most studies focusing on the role of financial development. For example, at the macro level 
King and Levine (1993a, b) find that financial development has a positive effect on 
productivity. Beck et al. (2000) show that financial intermediaries help economic growth 
through more efficient resource allocation rather than through investment or saving. Arestis 
et al. (2003) argue that financial policies affect growth mainly through total factor 
productivity (TFP). Rioja and Valev (2004) find that finance has a strong positive effect on 
productivity growth primarily in more developed economies. At the micro level, Ayyari et al. 
(2007) use a large panel of firms in 47 developing countries to show that external finance 
increases innovation. Finally, Gatti and Love (2008) find that access to credit has a positive 
impact on TFP in Bulgaria. Although these papers study various aspects on financial 
development or access to finance, they put little or no emphasis on the direct effect of 
financial constraints on productivity. They also tend to rely on country specific data or firm 
level data that do not allow to estimate TFP accurately. Our results show that the 
misspecification error can be large. Ours is the first study to provide empirical evidence at 
the firm level that financial constraints may not lead to lower productivity. 
                                                       
8  The simultaneity bias arises because investors may ration credit to the less productive firms.   5
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 
discusses the previous literature testing for the presence of firm-financing constraints and 
estimates the baseline measure of financial constraints. Section 4 outlines the estimation 
strategy to analyze the impact of financial constraints on productivity. Section 5 presents the 
results. Section 6 concludes. 
2  Data and stylized facts 
We use firm-level data provided by the Estonian Business Registry covering the period 1997 
to 2005. The dataset is an unbalanced panel containing detailed information on balance 
sheets and income statements of all registered firms in Estonia. Entry and exit are observed, 
and the number of business entities in the registry more than doubles over the sample period, 
from 21,183 firms in 1997 to 51,385 firms in 2005. However, due to missing information and 
the exclusion of extreme or unrealistic observations, only the data of 45 percent of the firms 
in the registry (accounting for about 60 percent of aggregated value added in 2004
9) can be 
used.
10 
One of the unique features of the dataset is the absence of any size thresholds. About 99 
percent of the firms in the dataset are small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), of which 
micro-enterprises are the dominant form of business organization, accounting for 69 percent 
of the total number of firms (Figure 1).
11 In addition, more than 90 percent of the firms 
included in the dataset are privately owned (Table 1).
12  The sectors with the largest share of 
foreign-owned firms are “mining and quarrying” and “manufacturing”, but the percentages 
remain very low. This makes this dataset particularly well-suited to analyze the implications 
of financial frictions since privately owned firms, and SMEs in particular, usually receive a 
very low share of credit in many emerging markets, despite accounting for a large share of 
                                                       
9  Comparability between the micro and macro data is limited, however, owing to methodological 
inconsistencies. Value added at the macro level is a broader concept since it covers not only the activities of 
enterprises but also of other economic units. According to the Statistical Office of Estonia, all enterprises 
registered in Estonia accounted for about 70 percent of aggregate value added in 2005. 
10  For a detailed description of the data and definitions, see Appendix A. More detailed information on the 
dataset itself can be found in Masso et al. (2004). 
11  SMEs are defined as enterprises with less than 250 employees. Micro-enterprises are those with 10 or less 
employees. 
12  A firm is labeled private (foreign) if the sum of the private (foreign)-owned shares surpasses 50 percent.   6
enterprises, employment, and output. The OECD notes that SMEs are, in fact, in a severe 
disadvantage relative to their larger and more established counterparts, mainly due to 
monitoring difficulties and asymmetric information (OECD, 2006). As a result, the majority 
of these firms is often denied any access to the formal credit markets in emerging and 
developing countries.   
Another salient feature of the dataset is the availability of data from all economic sectors in 
Estonia. Table 2 reports the number of firms in the sample by year and broad industry group. 
Most enterprises (61 percent of the total number of firms) are operating in business services 
sectors (such as wholesale and retail trade, hotel and restaurants, or transport activities). The 
manufacturing sector is the second most important sector in Estonia, accounting for 17 
percent of the total number of enterprises. The number of firms in the dataset increases over 
time, partly due to an improvement in the coverage.
13 However, most of the new firms are 
newly registered firms and are thus effective entrants. Although declining, Estonian entry and 
exit rates are fairly high by international standards (Figure 2). Exit rates among Estonian 
firms were particularly high in the late 1990s. The high firm turnover may be partly related to 
the restructuring during the transition period, with a shift from large-scale state-owned 
production to smaller private units. Although start-ups and very young firms may have 
innovative products and services and high growth prospects, they typically lack sufficient 
collateral. According to the OECD, this group in particular faces important obstacles in 
accessing adequate financing. 
For the rest of the analysis we exclude all financial, insurance and real estate firms, plus 
public services companies since they are not or less subject to financial constraints, or their 
investment behavior depends more on political decisions or broader economic policy rather 
than on access to (external) finance.
14 In addition, we exclude state-owned firms since they 
are more likely to face soft budget constraints, and are not necessarily profit-maximizing 
agents—a necessary assumption in our productivity estimation in Section 4.
15  
                                                       
13  The improvement in data coverage may be related to the introduction in 2000 of fines penalizing those firms 
that do not submit income or balance sheet statements. 
14  More specifically, we exclude the sectors with EMTAK 65 to 70 (financial intermediation and real estate 
activities) and EMTAK 75 to 99 (public services). See Table A.1 for a complete list of the sectors. 
15  See Kornai (1979, 1986) for the introduction and discussion of the concept of a soft budget constraint. A   7
As a preliminary analysis of the impact of financial frictions, we provide some summary 
statistics on the differences between firms that utilize external finance versus firms without it. 
In particular, Table 3 shows that more than half of the firms in our sample have no long-term 
liabilities on their balance sheets during their entire lifespan. These firms are on average 
much smaller in terms of number of employees, sales or value added, and they are slightly 
younger. In addition, their capital intensity, labor productivity, and investment rate are 
considerably lower than those firms that borrow from banks or private investors. Figures 3 
through 5 graph trends in key microeconomic variables for firms with long-term liabilities 
(Debt) compared to firms without them (No debt). Specifically, Figure 3 shows that firms 
with debt are on average always more productive, but the difference is rather small until the 
year 2000. However, in more recent years, firms with debt experienced an exponential 
growth in their labor productivity, whereas no-debt firms’ productivity increased only 
slightly. Figure 4 focuses on the capital intensity, and shows a comparable pattern. Capital 
intensity more than doubled from 124,000 Estonian Krooni in 2000 to almost 310,000 
Estonian Krooni in 2005 for those firms with long-term liabilities, as opposed to an almost 
flat trend for the group of firms without debt. Finally, Figure 5 graphs investment as a ratio 
of total assets, and shows that the ratio is about twice as high for firms utilizing external 
finance than those without it over the entire sample. Although the trends in the investment 
ratio are similar for both groups, the investment ratio of indebted firms declined immediately 
in the aftermath of the Russian crisis, whereas the no-debt firms responded with one-year lag. 
In addition, the rate of increase in investment was much higher among indebted firms: the 
investment ratio rose by merely one percentage point for firms without external finance, 
while that ratio was 22 percent higher than the 1999 level for firms with external debt. 
Overall, these patterns illustrate fundamental differences in the performance and operation of 
firms that borrow from banks or private investors versus firms without long-term liabilities. 
In the rest of the paper we exploit these observed dissimilarities and try to disentangle the 
correlation between a more formal measure of financing constraints and productivity. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
series of papers have found that financial constraints were absent or limited in some transition countries and 
have argued this was due to the persistence of soft budget constraints (see, for example, Budina et al., 2000; 
Lizal and Svejnar (2002); and Konings et al., 2003).   8
3  Measuring financial constraints 
To construct a measure of financial constraints, we rely on the literature of investment 
sensitivity to internal finance. Modigliani and Miller (1958) show that under certain 
assumptions, including perfect capital markets, internal and external funds are perfect 
substitutes. Therefore, a firm’s financial structure and liquidity should be irrelevant for its 
investment decisions. Since this influential paper, however, an extensive theoretical literature 
has shown that capital market imperfections can make external finance more expensive than 
internal finance due to informational asymmetries, costly monitoring, contract enforcement, 
and incentives problems.
16 As a result, firms with weak balance sheets may have limited 
access to external finance, and are obliged to rely on internally generated cash to finance 
their investment projects. The majority of the empirical literature has interpreted the excess 
sensitivity of a firm’s investment spending to its ability to internally generate cash as the 
existence of financial constraints. 
The first empirical papers in this field used a Q-model of investment to study financing 
constraints.
17 Several articles emphasize, however, a number of problems with the 
Q-methodology related to measurement errors, unrealistic assumptions, and identification 
problems.
18 This paper follows the more recent literature (inter alia Bond et al. 2003; Love, 
2003; and Forbes, 2007) and focuses on an Euler-equation model of financial constraints. 
Although the Q-theory and Euler-equation models of investment depart from the same 
optimization problem, the assumptions required to estimate the Euler equation are less strong. 
In addition, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) critique, who question the approach of Fazzari et al. 
(1988) of using investment-cash flow sensitivities as a proxy for financing constraints, has 
not yet been theoretically proven in a dynamic multi-period setting with investment 
adjustment costs (Bond et al., 2003). Finally, information on a firm’s market value, which is 
used as a proxy for Tobin’s q, is only available for publicly listed companies. The Euler 
equation has the advantage that it avoids the use of share prices. 
                                                       
16  See Stein (2001) for a review of the theoretical literature. 
17 The  Q-theory of investment was pioneered by Tobin (1969) and further extended by Hayashi (1982). We 
refer to Hubbard (1998) for a review of the empirical literature. 
18  See Schiantarelli (1996) and Hubbard (1998) for a detailed description of these issues.   9
3.1  Euler-equation approach 
The Euler equation is a structural model derived from a dynamic optimization problem under 
the assumption of symmetric, quadratic costs of adjustment. It relates current investment to 
last period’s investment and the marginal product of capital, and has the advantage of 
controlling for all expectational influences on the investment decision. The main 
disadvantage is that the structure of adjustment costs is rather restrictive. Besides, the Euler 
equation approach may fail to detect the presence of financial constraints if the tightness of 
such constraints is approximately constant over time (Schiantarelli, 2005). While this risk is 
particularly severe in very short panels, our data covers a period long enough to record 
changes in individual firms’ financial strength and overall macroeconomic conditions. The 























































   (1) 
where Iit is the investment expenditure of firm i at time t; Salesit is the net revenue received 
from the sale of products, goods and services: Cashit represents a firm’s internal financial 
position measured by its stock of liquid assets at the start of period t; αi represents a firm 
fixed effect, and δt denotes a time dummy. All variables in equation (1) are in real terms and 
are weighted by one-period lagged capital (K). In this model, the cash stock affects the rate of 
inter-temporal substitution between investment today and investment tomorrow. If a firm is 
financially constrained, the impact of cash stock on the inter-temporal allocation decision 
will be positive. The more financially constrained a firm is, the larger will be the impact of 
its available cash stock on the cost of capital. In other words, an increase in cash stock will 
lower the implied cost of capital, making investment today more attractive that investment 
tomorrow. This implies that a firm is considered to be financially constrained if the cash 
coefficient, θ3, is estimated to be positive. The idea behind this equation is that the larger the 
sensitivity of investment to cash stock (or cash flow), the more constrained the firm is   10
because it has to rely on its internal funds to finance its investment projects.
19 
3.2  Empirical model 
Typically, the literature divides a sample of firms based on a characteristic that is a priori 
expected to affect financial constraints, and then compares the cash-sensitivity of investment 
for both groups. This approach implies that a firm belongs to the financially constrained or 
unconstrained group for the entire period of time, without the possibility to transit between 
different financial states. In addition, partitioning observations into groups on the basis of a 
single indicator may not always be a sufficient indicator for liquidity constraints. The 
severity of financial constraints often varies among firms of the same subgroup because of 
other factors that are not controlled for. One possible way to address both issues is to use 
endogenous switching regressions methods with unknown sample separation.
20 Yet, this 
approach comes at the cost that one has to make very restrictive assumptions of the 
underlying investment model. Instead, we estimate and construct for each firm a score of 
cash sensitivity based on a range of firm characteristics that may affect its ability to attract 
external finance, while controlling for the information contained in other factors. To 
determine this set of variables, we browse the existing literature. First, one of the most 
widely used proxy for the degree of liquidity constraints is firm Size. Smaller firms are likely 
to be financially constrained for a number of reasons: (1) small firms often lack sufficient 
collateral; (2) SMEs tend to show a more volatile pattern of growth and earnings, with 
greater fluctuations than larger companies; (3) large firms can raise debt more easily because 
they are more diversified and less prone to bankruptcy. All these factors raise the cost of 
external finance for small firms, hence supporting the hypothesis that small firms have a 
higher sensitivity of investment to internal funds. Second, similar to size, Age may proxy for 
the wedge between the costs of external versus internal capital. Agency and information 
problems are more severe for young firms since they have not yet built up a track record that 
                                                       
19  Although cash stock may be a proxy for future profit opportunities, it has been argued that this would only be 
the case in the presence of financial constraints (see, for example, Love, 2001). The main idea is that holding 
liquid assets is costly. Therefore, a firm, anticipating profitable investment opportunities, will accumulate liquid 
assets only if it expects to be financially constrained.   
20  This methodology does not require a prior knowledge of whether a firm is financially constrained since the 
probability of a firm facing a high premium on external finance is endogenously determined by multiple firm 
characteristics. See, for example, Hu and Schiantarelli (1998), Hovakimian and Titman (2004), and Almeida 
and Campello (2007).   11
helps investors to distinguish good from bad enterprises. Also the provision of collateral is 
particularly difficult for start-ups and other relatively young businesses. Third, the ratio of 
debt to total assets, Leverage, signals two opposite effects. On the one hand, higher debt 
means that the firm had access to external finance in the past, which may be an indication 
that the firm does not face liquidity constraints. However, it does not necessarily mean that 
the firm obtained as much finance as it would have liked to or whether the received loan was 
below the optimal value. On the other hand, leverage may negatively affect investment 
expenditures through (1) a liquidity effect (see, for example, Lang et al., 1996); and (2) 
because highly leveraged firms may face bigger hurdles in accessing external sources of 
capital.
21 Finally, Harrison and McMillan (2003) argue that foreign firms are not or less 
credit constrained because they are more profitable and/or have access to more collateral, and 
they find evidence supporting their hypothesis. To assess the statistical significance of a 
given factor in proxying financial constraints, each of the above discussed variables is 
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Sizeit is measured as total assets at the beginning of period t; Ageit is the age of the firm at the 
beginning of period t, based on the entry date in the Registry; Leverageit stands for the ratio 
of long-term liabilities to total assets at the beginning of period t; Foreignit is a dummy 
equaling one if more than 50 percent of the shares is foreign owned at time t. Finally, we take 
into account differences in investment-cash sensitivity across sectors, i.e. we allow for a 
different intercept for each 2-digit industry (I1,…,IN). The estimated coefficients for the δ’s 
and the λ’s are then used to calculate a firm-specific score of financial constraints  F
n
it ˆ  based 
on the firm’s characteristics: 
                                                       
21  The basic idea is that debt-overhang reduces the incentives of shareholders to invest in profitable projects 
since the benefits partly accrue to the debt holders. For a detailed discussion see Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
and Myers (1977).   12
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The bigger  F
n
it ˆ , the higher the degree of financial constraints. Although the coefficients are 
constant over the entire sample period, the characteristics of each firm change over time and 
hence also its degree of financial constraints. 
3.3  Estimation issues 
Since equation (2) is a dynamic investment model with a lagged dependent variable (Iit-1/Kit-2) 
and unobserved time-invariant firm-specific effects (αi), we estimate the equation using a 
Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) estimator. By construction, the fixed effects are 
correlated with the lagged dependent variable, making standard estimators inconsistent. 
First-differencing the equation removes the fixed effects, eliminating a potential source of 
omitted variable bias in the estimation. Yet, the presence of the lagged dependent variable 
continues to bias the coefficient estimates, and many of the variables in the investment 
equation are likely to be jointly endogenous—i.e. simultaneously determined with the 
dependent variable or subject to two-way causality. 
To control for these biases, Arellano and Bond (1991) developed a two-step GMM estimator 
that instruments the differenced variables that are not strictly exogenous with all their 
available lags in levels. Under the assumptions that (i) the explanatory variables are 
predetermined by at least one period, and (ii) the error terms are not serially correlated, the 
estimated coefficients will be consistent and efficient. A problem with the original 
Arellano-Bond estimator is that lagged levels are poor instruments for first differences if the 
variables are close to a random walk. Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond 
(1998) describe how the use of lagged first-differences as instruments for equations in levels, 
in addition to the usual lagged levels as instruments for equations in first-differences, can 
increase efficiency of the estimator.
22 This so-called system GMM method is flexible in 
generating instruments, and one can test the validity of the assumptions First, the 
Sargan/Hansen  J-test of over-identifying restrictions tests the null hypothesis of no 
correlation between the instruments and the residuals, and its statistic has an asymptotic 
                                                       
22  The additional assumption for the system-GMM estimator is that the first-differences of instrumenting   13
chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the difference in the number of 
instruments and regressors. Second, we test for different-order serial correlation in the 
residuals. The presence of autocorrelation in the error terms would indicate that lags of the 
dependent variable (and any other variables used as instruments that are not strictly 
exogenous), are in fact endogenous and thus bad instruments. Since first-order 
autocorrelation is expected, one has to test for second-order serial correlation in the 
differenced equation. If there is evidence of second-order serial correlation, but no 
third-order (or higher), then the level variables lagged by two periods (or more) are valid 
instruments. 
A weakness of the first-difference transformation is that it magnifies gaps in unbalanced 
panels. To maximize our sample size we use the “orthogonal deviations transform” of 
Arellano and Bover (1995). Instead of subtracting the previous observation from the 
contemporaneous one, it subtracts the average of all future available observations of a 
variable. No matter how many gaps, it is computable for all observations except the last for 
each individual, so it minimizes data loss. 
3.4  Results on financial constraints 
The results for the estimation of the Euler-equation model are reported in Table 4. Equation 
(2), with Iit/Kit-1 as dependent variable, is estimated for each of the 10 industries separately. 
We apply a system GMM estimator combining equations in first-differences with equations 
in levels. The instruments used are the lagged values of all right-hand side variables dated t-3 
and t-4. This allows for contemporaneous correlation between these variables and shocks to 
the investment equation, as well as correlation with unobserved firm-specific effects. In other 
words, all right-hand variables are treated as potentially endogenous variables in the 
investment equation.   
The autocorrelation test and the robust estimates of the coefficient standard errors assume no 
correlation across individuals in the idiosyncratic disturbances. Time dummies make this 
assumption more likely to hold, so they are included in all regressions. In the GMM 
estimation year dummies are used as instruments for the equations in levels only. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
variables are uncorrelated with the unobserved firm-specific effects.   14
Additionally, each regression includes interactions of the variable Cashit/Kit-1 with 2-digit 
industry dummies (I1,…,IN), to allow for differences in financial constraints across 
sub-sectors in each industry. Neither the time dummies nor the 2-digit industry intercepts are 
reported in Table 4 to keep a clear overview, but we report the Wald test of the null 
hypothesis that both groups of variables are jointly insignificant. 
Since we have more instruments than exogenous variables, we have a number of 
over-identifying restrictions in each regression. Since the Sargan statistic is not robust to 
heteroskedasticity or autocorrelation, we report the robust Hansen J-statistic, which is the 
minimized value of the GMM criterion function. The Sargan/Hansen tests for 
over-identifying restrictions are unable to reject the validity of the instruments for each of the 
industries, and the tests of second-order serial correlation find no evidence of second-order 
autocorrelation in the differenced residuals.
23 
The coefficients on lagged investment and sales have the correct sign for most specifications, 
but are much smaller in absolute value than suggested by theoretical predictions. The 
coefficients are usually positive, with significance fluctuating across specifications. Focusing 
next on the interactions of the cash variable with the different proxies for liquidity constraints 
we find that, contrary to expectation, there are no significant differences in financing 
constraints based on firm size. The coefficient on (Cashit/Kit x Ageit), on the other hand, 
illustrates that in half of the industries older firms face significantly less hurdles in accessing 
external funds. Also highly indebted firms tend to encounter significant liquidity constraints. 
Finally, foreign firms seem to have easier access to external capital.
24 
Based on these results we construct a firm-specific score of financing constraints using the 
estimated coefficients and the information we have on its size, age, leverage, ownership 
structure, and the industry to which the firm belongs. In other words, we calculate for each 
firm a score based on equation (3). If a firm is not financially constrained, the score  Fit ˆ  is 
                                                       
23  Only for sector “renting of machinery and computer” (Ind. 9) we cannot reject the presence of second-order 
autocorrelation at the 5 percent significance level. 
24  As shown in Section 2 there are few foreign firms in each sector. This lack of variation could be a reason 
why we fail to find a significant effect of foreign ownership in most sectors.   15
censored to zero.
25 The bigger Fit ˆ  the higher the degree of liquidity constraints a firm 
faces. Table 5 provides an overview of the magnitude and distribution of the degree of 
financing constraints across sectors. A large number of firms seems to be subject to some 
degree of financial constraints. Overall, the degree of financial constraints tends to be highest 
in the primary sector (“agriculture” and “mining and quarrying”, and “energy, gas, and water 
supply”). This does not imply, however, that firms in other (less constrained) sectors are not 
financially constrained. As can be seen in the last column of Table 5, variation across firms is 
relatively larger in the primary sector and “hotels and restaurants”. 
Figure 6 graphs the industry means of the financing constraints over the period 1998-2005 
and shows wide discrepancies across sectors. In particular, financing constraints were 
relatively high in “agriculture” over the entire sample period but they have even increased 
further in recent years. The “mining and quarrying” sector displays a similar upward trend, 
while the financing constraints remained relatively constant across time for the other 
sectors.
26  
As a first indication of the impact of financing constraints on a firm’s performance, we look 
at the correlation between a firm’s degree of financing constraints and a number of firm 
characteristics, such as its value added, labor productivity, TFP, and sales per worker. Table 
6 displays the Spearman's rank correlation coefficients for all pairs of variables. This table 
shows that firms in industries with a relatively higher degree of financial constraints perform 
worse at all levels relative to firms in industries with easier access to external funds. The 
correlation is particularly strong in the case of firm labor productivity and TFP. In the next 
sections we explore this relationship more formally. 
 
                                                       
25  The overall conclusions are similar even if we do not censor the score of financial constraints to zero. A 
minority of firms has a negative score, but the industry means and medians remain positive. Also, the results for 
the rest of the analysis are similar. 
26  In principle, we would expect financial constraints to ease over time as the degree of financial intermediation 
increased in Estonia during this period. However, demand for credit may have increased more than the available 
funds because of the emergence of new financing needs as the economy grew and the entry of new firms. Also, 
this could be an indication of credit misallocation.   16
4  Relating productivity to financial constraints 
 
To analyze the relationship between firm-level financial constraints and productivity, we 
follow two alternative estimation procedures: an indirect approach and a structural one.   
4.1  Indirect approach 
In this approach, we proceed in two steps. First, we estimate firm-level total factor 
productivity. Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function, a measure of TFP can be 
obtained by estimating the equation 
, 0 it it it k it l it k l y ε ω β β β + + + + =        (4) 
where i and t indicate firm and time respectively, and all variables are presented in natural 
logarithms. Value added (yit) is measured as net sales minus intermediate inputs, labor input 
(lit) stands for the number of employees, and capital (kit) is net of accumulated depreciation 
and calculated as the sum of tangible and intangible fixed assets minus goodwill. All 
variables are in real terms (see Appendix A for details). The error term has two components: 
a productivity term ωit known to the firm and correlated with the inputs, and a random 
productivity shock εit. 
Equation (4) cannot be consistently estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) because of an 
endogeneity bias and a selection bias. The endogeneity bias stems from the correlation 
between unobserved productivity and a plant’s input decisions. If more productive plants 
tend to hire more workers and buy more materials due to higher current and anticipated 
future profitability, OLS will tend to provide upwardly biased estimates on the input 
coefficients. The selection bias arises because firms with productivity level below some 
threshold exit from the market. Yet, firms with larger capital stocks can expect larger future 
returns for any given level of current productivity, and will therefore continue in operation 
for lower productivity levels. This self-selection induced exit behavior leads to a negative 
bias in the OLS capital coefficient. 
To control for both biases, Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) suggest 
a methodology using respectively investment or intermediate inputs as a proxy for   17
productivity. Both papers make two key identifying assumptions. First, the proxy must be 
monotonically increasing with respect to the true productivity shock. Second, the so-called 
freely variable input (labor) responds immediately to a shock, while the state variable (capital) 
responds only after an adjustment lag. Given that state variables do not respond to 
contemporaneous noise, the idiosyncratic shock can be represented as a function of the proxy 
variable and state variables. A detailed description of the semi-parametric estimation 
methodology can be found in Appendix C. 
The key difference between the Olley-Pakes and Levinsohn-Petrin estimators is the choice of 
the proxy variable, where the former uses investment and the latter intermediate inputs. The 
data coverage of the proxy is an important factor in deciding which approach to use.
27 
Namely, the monotonicity condition requires strictly positive investment (in the case of 
Olley-Pakes) or intermediate inputs (in the case of Levinsohn-Petrin). Plants with infrequent 
investment would be systematically dropped from the Olley-Pakes estimation, with a 
significant loss in efficiency as result.
28  On the other hand, most firms report positive use of 
materials in each year, so it is possible to retain most observations. Given this feature of the 
Estonian data, we choose to use the Levinsohn-Petrin intermediate proxy estimator rather 
than the Olley-Pakes investment proxy estimator. 
We estimate equation (4) for each 2-digit industry separately to allow for technological 
differences across industries, and time dummies are included to capture macroeconomic 
changes. The estimated input coefficients are reported in Appendix C (Table C.1), together 
with the OLS estimates for comparison. We use bootstrapping methods to obtain correct 
standard errors for the capital coefficient, where we use 1000 replications.
29 As expected, 
the labor coefficients are over-estimated with OLS. Using these production coefficient 
estimates, we define the log of measured TFP of firm i at time t in industry j as 






it β β ˆ ˆ − − =   (Table C.1, last column). 
                                                       
27  Other differences are related to the underlying assumptions and estimation techniques. See Ackerberg et al. 
(2005) for a review and detailed discussion of the Olley-Pakes and Levinsohn-Petrin methodologies. 
28  In our dataset there is a substantial number of zero or missing investment observations (about 45 percent of 
the total number of observations). 
29  The use of estimated regressors at different stages of the procedure increases the final coefficients’ variability. 
Therefore, bootstrapped standard errors on the capital coefficient tend to be overestimated (Pakes and Olley, 
1995). See Horowitz (2001) for an overview of the bootstrap estimation methodology.   18
In the second step of our indirect approach, we examine the relation between firm 
productivity and financing frictions, and estimate a productivity equation with financial 
constraints as main regressor. For ease of notation the industry index is dropped. 
ε δ δ β β β it t j it x it f it X F tfp + + + + + = −
'
1 0 ˆ                      ( 5 )  
where  Fit ˆ 1 −   represents the lagged firm-level measure of financial constraints obtained from 
Section 3. To limit a potential endogeneity of financial constraints with respect to 
productivity, our measure of financial constraints is included in the regression with one-year 
lag. Xit is a vector of firm i’s characteristics, which includes the logarithm of age and size, 
and ownership dummies. δj and δt are 2-digit industry and year dummies. Equation (5) is 
estimated using OLS and we use bootstrapping methods to obtain consistent standard errors 
for the coefficients. Here again we use 1000 replications. 
4.2  Structural approach 
The indirect approach described above suffers from two problems. First, Levinsohn and 
Petrin (2003) assume firm productivity follows a first-order Markov process. However, 
equation (5) does not control for lagged productivity and thus suffers from serial correlation. 
As a result, our lagged measure of financial constraints will be correlated with the error term, 
yielding our estimates inconsistent.
30 Even if we were to control for lagged productivity 
there will be a second problem. In particular, conditional on lagged productivity, we would 
still be assuming that current productivity depends on financial constraints and other 
determinants, which are known to the firm in advance. Yet, the Markov process assumption 
in the Levinsohn-Petrin methodology implies that, conditional on lagged productivity, 
current firm productivity should be a surprise. Thus, the estimated productivity measures and 
the impact of financial constraints on productivity would be biased.
31  
To control for these issues, we incorporate financial constraints directly as a regressor in the 
                                                       
30  tfpit-1 will be part of the error term in equation (5) since productivity is assumed to follow a first-order 
Markov process. Given the endogeneity of financial constraints with respect to productivity,  Fit ˆ 1 − will be 
correlated with tfpit-1 and, therefore, the error term in (5). 
31  It could be argued that, in this case, the identification conditions for productivity are violated and the 
materials demand function is not invertible.   19
production function equation:   
, ˆ ) ln( 1 0 it it t j it f it a it k it l it F Age k l y ε ω δ δ β β β β β + + + + + + + + = −    (6) 
where  εit is a zero-mean shock uncorrelated with inputs, financial constraints, and firm 
characteristics. To estimate equation (6), we modify Levinsohn-Petrin algorithm and treat 
financial constraints as an additional state variable.
32  As in Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), the 
coefficients of labor and plant characteristics are obtained in the first step using 
semi-parametric techniques utilizing the variable materials to correct the simultaneity bias 
between labor and productivity. However, the materials’ demand function now becomes a 
function of three state variables, capital, productivity and financial constraints, 
( ) 1 ˆ , , − = it it it it it F k m m ω . Assuming monotonicity holds we can invert the materials’ demand 
function to obtain an expression for productivity depending on observable state 
variables, ( ) 1 ˆ , , − = it it it it it F k m ω ω . Then, equation (6) can be rewritten in the following 
partially linear form 
( ) , ˆ , , ) ln( 1 it t j it it it t it a it l it F k m Age l y ε δ δ λ β β + + + + + = −     (7) 
where 
( ) ( ). ˆ , , ˆ ˆ , , 1 1 0 1 − − − + + + = it it it it it f it k it it it t F k m F k F k m ω β β β λ      
We use a third-order polynomial with a full set of interactions to approximate unknown 
function λt, and estimate equation (7) using OLS. This gives us consistent coefficients on 
labor and other firm characteristics. In the second stage of the estimation algorithm, the 
probability that a firm exits from the Estonian registry is determined by the probability that 
the end-of-period productivity falls below an exit threshold. The same third-order polynomial 
in mit, kit, and  Fit ˆ 1 −  of the first stage is used to estimate the surviving probability. In the 
final step we estimate the coefficients on capital and financial constraints using non-linear 
least squares. Year and 2-digit industry dummies are included as well and taken along the 
estimation procedure. Standard errors for the parameter estimates are obtained by bootstrap.   20
Since capital and financial constraints enter the function λt(.) twice, we need an additional 
identification assumption. We continue to assume that productivity follows a first-order 
Markov process  () ξ ω ω ω it it it it E + = −1 | . Using this assumption, the identification condition 
for capital is that capital responds with a lag to productivity shocks. Therefore, we can 
identify the capital coefficient by using the condition: 
[ ] . 0 | = + k E it it it ξ ε         ( 8 )  
Because of the potential endogeneity, we include a lag of our measure of financial constraints. 
It is assumed that the financial constraints are observed by the firm in period t-1, similar to 
the assumption that plants choose their material input in period t-1 before productivity ωit is 
known. This means that investors may ration credit to firms based on their information set in 
t-1. Given that productivity follows a Markov process, the shock in period t should be a 
surprise to investors and, thus, Fit ˆ 1 −  should be uncorrelated with ξit . Therefore, the 
following moment condition identifies the coefficient of financial constraints: 
[ ] . 0 ˆ | 1 = + − F E it it it ξ ε       ( 9 )  
5  Results 
5.1  Baseline results 
In this section we discuss the baseline results of the indirect and structural approaches. Table 
7 presents the results for the indirect approach. The dependent variable is the log form of 
either labor productivity (column 1), or total factor productivity obtained from estimating 
equation (4) using OLS (column 2), or using the Levinsohn-Petrin methodology (column 3). 
This allows us to check the sensitivity of our results to different productivity measures. For 
the specification with labor productivity we add the capital intensity of a firm as an 
additional explanatory variable to control for the fact that firms with higher capital intensity 
tend to have a higher level of productivity. The results in Table 7 are obtained from 
estimating equation (5) with OLS (bootstrapped standard errors in brackets). Though not 
reported in the table, all regressions include 2-digit industry dummies and time dummies. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
32  A similar approach is used in Fernandes (2007).   21
The negative and statistically significant coefficient on financing constraints indicates that 
firms with bigger hurdles to obtain external finance have a lower productivity level. Overall, 
the three different specifications of productivity yield very similar results although the effect 
on TFP is larger than that for labor productivity. The overall fit, as measured by the 
R-squared, increases when using the more consistent TFP estimator of Levinsohn and Petrin 
rather than the OLS estimate of TFP. In line with the findings of the literature on enterprise 
productivity, foreign firms are significantly more productive than their domestic counterparts. 
Finally, productivity is negatively correlated with age, but positively correlated with size.
33  
To analyze whether the impact of financial constraints on productivity varies across sectors, 
we estimate equation (5) for each industry (defined at the 1-digit level) separately. Table 8 
shows that financing constraints considerably curtail productivity in most sectors except for 
“mining and quarrying”, “wholesale and retail trade”, and “transport and communication”. 
This is consistent with the statistics reported in Table 5 and Figure 6 showing that the degree 
of financial constraints in the latter two sectors was relatively small. However, investment of 
Estonian firms operating in the mining sectors displayed a much higher sensitivity to 
internally generated cash flows than in the average sector but this does not seem to affect 
productivity significantly.   
Since the estimates from the indirect approach may be subject to misspecification biases, as 
discussed in section 4, we report the results from the structural approach in Table 9. The 
dependent variable is the log form of real value added, and bootstrapped standard errors are 
reported in brackets. In contrast to the indirect approach, we find that financial constraints do 
not have an impact on firm-level productivity for most sectors. In particular, the last column 
of Table 9 shows that the coefficient on financial constraints is not significantly different 
from zero in eight out of ten sectors. Only in the sectors “construction” and “R&D and other 
business activities” the negative impact remains significant.
34  A possible explanation for this 
result could be that firms in both sectors are heavily dependent on external finance for their 
operations. In particular, firms in the construction sector need capital to pre-finance their 
                                                       
33  In an alternative specification we estimated equation (5) including the squared age and size terms, but the 
results remain the same. 
34  In fact, these were two of the sectors where we found the highest impact of financial constraints on 
productivity using the indirect approach. The magnitude of the coefficients is roughly the same as in the indirect   22
projects since, in most cases, they will not have enough liquidity until the construction 
projects are finished and sold. Therefore, if firms are unable to convince banks or investors 
that their projects are worthwhile, or if they cannot present sufficient collateral, they cannot 
undertake productivity-enhancing activities with a detrimental effect on TFP relative to 
unconstrained firms. Similarly, firms in the R&D sector need a continuous inflow of fresh 
capital to keep up with the latest technology and invest in frontier-research. In general this 
involves risky investment, and few banks and investors are willing to take this risk. Even the 
smallest constraint in obtaining adequate funding entails major consequences for the firm. 
This result is confirmed by a recent OECD study in which they argue that the lack of 
appropriate financing has been a hindrance to the expansion of innovative (high-tech) SMEs 
in most OECD countries (OECD, 2006).
35 Without special arrangements to finance R&D 
projects, the R&D sector will lack the necessary dynamism for employment creation and 
competitiveness, and positive spillovers to other sectors will be limited.   
 
Overall these results indicate that, although many Estonian firms may be subject to financial 
constraints, these have not resulted in significant differences in productivity levels. These 
results also show that the misspecification errors of previous studies could be large.   
5.2  Robustness checks 
This section discusses the robustness of the structural approach’s results reported above. 
Table 10 summarizes the various tests we perform. We begin by looking at whether the 
results are sensitive to the time period considered. In particular, we split the sample in two 
periods: column (1) only includes 1997 to 2000, while column (2) includes the latter period 
from 2001 to 2005.The choice of these sub-periods is partly motivated by the fact that the 
quality of data improves substantially after 2000. Also, during the first period, credit growth 
slowed down sharply in the aftermath of the Russian crisis, recovering after 2000. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
approach. 
35  The results on the R&D sector are also in line with the findings of Aghion et al. (2007b). In particular, they 
argue that if firms can choose between short-term capital investment and long-term R&D investment, and 
innovation requires liquidity that can only be covered through short-run earnings and borrowing, negative 
shocks will reduce R&D investment and innovation more in firms that are credit constrained. Using data for 
France they find evidence supporting that theory.   23
Next we explore the impact of sample selection and removing outliers. First, we include 
those firms with negative investment (column 3). Second, for each industry, we eliminate 
from our sample those firms above the 99
th percentile of the distribution of financial 
constraints to control for possible outliers in our measure of liquidity constraints (column 4).   
Finally, we examine whether modifying the financial constraint variable has any significant 
impact on the results. In particular, we estimate financial constraints by using a standard 
accelerator model of investment (as in Konings et al., 2003). This type of model links the 
demand for capital goods to the level or change in firm’s output or sales, and has been used 
in the empirical literature very successfully (see, for example, Abel and Blanchard, 1986; and 
Fazzari et al., 1988).   
This series of sensitivity tests suggests that the key results reported in section 5.1 are highly 
robust. In particular, financial constraints do not seem to have a negative impact on 
productivity for most sectors. However, the results on the construction sector are weak since 
the coefficient of financial constraints, although still negative, loses its significance in many 
specifications (for example, for the period 2000-05). The results for the R&D sector are, 
however, remarkably robust, suggesting that the negative impact of financial constraints on 
productivity was very large during the period 2000-05. Nevertheless, that effect is reduced 
when using an alternative definition of financial constraints (column 4). 
6  Conclusion 
This paper provides new evidence on the link between finance and firm-level productivity 
focusing on the case of Estonia. We contribute to the literature in two important respects. 
First, we look explicitly at the role of financial constraints. For that purpose, we construct a 
measure that allows us to capture differences in the degree of financial constraints across 
firms and time. Second, we develop a methodology to estimate the impact of financial 
constraints on productivity that addresses some of the shortcomings of previous studies. In 
our estimation, we rely on production function estimates that correct for the simultaneity of 
input choices and exit.   
   24
Our results indicate that young and highly indebted firms tend to be more financially 
constrained. Overall, a large number of firms displays some degree of financial constraints 
with firms in the primary sector being the most constrained. More importantly, we find that 
financial constraints do not have an impact on productivity for most sectors with the 
exception of R&D, where financial constraints have a negative impact on productivity and 
that effect is large. These results are robust to a variety of sensitivity checks. 
 
What can explain these findings? There are a number of reasons why access to finance may 
not necessarily improve productivity for most sectors. First, in the face or rapid credit growth 
it is difficult for credit officers to screen clients and ensure that capital is allocated to the 
most productive activities (see, for example, Ghani and Suri, 1999). The rapid build-up in 
credit thus lowers the quality of investment and reduces the expected productivity gain. 
Second, higher liquidity may reduce the incentive of shareholders to undertake costly 
monitoring of managers, which impedes efficient resource allocation and slows productivity 
growth (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; and Bhide, 1993). Third, overinvestment and low 
productivity may also result when managers maximize their own utility rather than firm 
profits (Grabowsky and Mueller, 1972). Finally, access to finance may lead to an increase in 
firms’ production capacity—for example, by expanding plant size—without necessarily 
increasing productivity (Power, 1998). All of these arguments indicate that financially 
unconstrained firms may not necessarily have higher productivity levels than constrained 
firms. In the absence of a more explicit estimation model we cannot distinguish which of 
these channels is at play in Estonia. This is an area for future research.   
 
Our conclusions are, however, subject to some important caveats. First, firms are defined as 
being financially constrained if their investment is affected by their cash, after controlling for 
future expected profitability. Although this strategy has been widely used, there is an open 
debate on the accuracy of this definition. Second, the use of estimated regressors at different 
stages of the direct approach increases the final coefficients’ variability. Therefore, 
bootstrapped standard errors on the financial constraints variable may be overestimated, 
resulting in its insignificance for most sectors. In any case, the results in this paper provide a   25
cautionary note, underscoring that the efficiency of credit allocation is what matters for 
productivity and output growth and that is not always a sure thing.   26
Private State Foreign
Agriculture 96% 0% 3%
Mining & Quarrying 88% 0% 12%
Manufacturing 90% 0% 10%
Electricity, Gas & Water 59% 40% 1%
Construction 97% 0% 2%
Business services 92% 1% 7%
Public services 94% 3% 3%
Total 93% 1% 6%
   Sources: Estonian Business Registry database; and authors' calculations.
   1/ Percentage of otal firms in each sector.
Table 1. Ownership Structure 1/
 
Industry 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Total
Agriculture 516 542 538 599 677 777 829 878 805 6,161
Mining and quarrying 31 29 31 34 42 47 49 47 51 361
Manufacturing 1,377 1,605 1,881 2,205 2,508 2,728 3,000 3,127 3,063 21,494
Electricity, gas, and water 98 133 138 136 142 153 155 158 153 1,266
Construction 714 892 937 1,110 1,303 1,488 1,694 1,988 2,287 12,413
Business services 4,844 5,976 6,662 8,092 9,206 10,132 10,708 11,421 11,376 78,417
Public services 352 505 603 719 874 1,029 1,184 1,272 1,327 7,865
Total 7,932 9,682 10,790 12,895 14,752 16,354 17,619 18,891 19,062 127,977
   Sources: Estonian Business Registry database; and authors' calculations.
Table 2. Number of Firms by Year and Industry, 1997–2005
 
Debt No debt
Percentage of firms 46% 54%
Number of employees 23 7
Age 6 5
Sales 17,200 4,664
Value added 5,247 1,339
Capital intensity 198 59
Labor productivity 980 750
Labor productivity growth 0.06 0.04
Investment ratio 0.12 0.05
   Sources: Estonian Business Registry database; and authors' calculations.
   Notes: firms are divided in 2 groups: firms with long-term liabilities (Debt) and firmswith 
   no long-term liabilities on their balance sheets during their entire lifespan (No debt). All
   variables are measured in thousand of Estonian Krones and deflated by 2-digit sector 
   deflators; all variable definitions can be found in Appendix A. Capital intensity is defined as 
   (net real tangible + net real intangible assets-goodwill)/labor; labor productivity= real sales 
   per worker; investment ratio=real investment/real total assets lagged 1 year.
Table 3. Summary Statistics
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Ind. 1 
(1) Ind. 2 Ind. 3 Ind. 4 Ind. 5 Ind. 6 Ind. 7 Ind. 8 Ind. 9 Ind. 10
IKt-1 -0.147** 0.007 0.159* -0.089 0.070 0.060 0.203*** -0.109 -0.012 0.052
[0.064] [0.079] [0.085] [0.076] [0.094] [0.068] [0.075] [0.066] [0.068] [0.069]
YK -0.002 0.0366*** 0.00283** 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.00800** 0.000 0.0198*** 0.003
[0.003] [0.009] [0.001] [0.011] [0.000] [0.000] [0.004] [0.001] [0.006] [0.003]
CK x size 0.034 -0.009 -0.007 -0.004 -0.012 0.007 0.016 0.007 0.001 -0.003
[0.028] [0.007] [0.016] [0.025] [0.010] [0.009] [0.012] [0.007] [0.010] [0.008]
CK x age -0.086 0.197* -0.0748** 0.102 -0.0680** -0.008 0.062 -0.0897*** -0.0788* -0.0794***
[0.053] [0.110] [0.036] [0.064] [0.029] [0.034] [0.074] [0.026] [0.043] [0.027]
CK x leverage 5.374*** 5.401*** 0.169*** 3.745*** 0.705 0.026 1.601*** 0.056 0.792 0.394***
[0.940] [1.140] [0.061] [0.970] [1.070] [0.097] [0.400] [0.120] [0.540] [0.140]
CK x foreign -0.622*** 0.278 -0.008 -1.247** 0.046 -0.015 0.009 -0.111*** 0.002 -0.052
[0.210] [0.470] [0.079] [0.500] [0.037] [0.022] [0.077] [0.039] [0.032] [0.039]
Number of observations 1,749 183 7,463 187 3,551 12,211 1,677 3,074 680 3,073
Number of firms 653 44 2,677 73 1,386 4,814 724 1,213 310 1,230
Sargan 0.001 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.030
Sargan/Hansen 
(2) 0.493 1.000 0.815 1.000 0.372 0.103 0.358 0.692 0.658 0.259
AR(2) 
(2) 0.106 0.368 0.170 0.401 0.965 0.123 0.861 0.317 0.085 0.707
Industry dummies 
(3) 0.070 0.238 0.000 0.731 0.042 0.978 0.006 0.001 0.594 0.020
Year dummies 
(3) 0.000 0.772 0.011 0.166 0.011 0.358 0.771 0.077 0.838 0.004
   Sources: Estonian Business Registry database; and authors' calculations.
   Notes: Equation (2), with I it/K it -1 as dependent variable, is estimated using system GMM. Though not reported, all regressions include time dummies, 
   as well as the interaction of Cashit/Kit-1 with 2-digit industry dummies. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. Heteroskedasticity consistent standard 
   errors are reported in brackets, with significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
   (1) The 10 industries are: 1. Agriculture; 2. Mining & Quarrying; 3. Manufacturing; 4. Energy, Gas & Water supply; 5. Construction; 6. Wholesale 
   and Retail trade; 7. Hotels & Restaurants; 8. Transport & Communication; 9. Renting of machinery & Computer; 10. R&D and other business activities.
   (2) The Sargan/Hansen and autocorrelation specification tests are reported as p-values.
   (3) To keep a clear overview, we report neither the interactions of Cash it/K it -1 with the 2-digit industry dummies nor the time dummies. Instead 
   we report the p-values for the Wald test of joint significance for both groups of included variables.
Table 4. Euler-equation specification, estimated using system GMM







1 Agriculture 5,369 286 1.035 0.482 1.441
2 Mining and quarrying 342 110 0.415 0.037 0.839
3 Manufacturing 19,346 3,046 0.093 0.066 0.106
4 Electricity, gas and water supply 550 67 0.456 0.083 0.714
5 Construction 11,001 1,034 0.099 0.055 0.142
6 Wholesale and retail trade 36,836 76 0.031 0.031 0.013
7 Hotels and restaurants 5,296 831 0.304 0.046 1.117
8 Transport and communication 9,547 649 0.090 0.070 0.081
9 Renting of machinery and computer activities 2,413 290 0.121 0.054 0.266
10 Research and development and other business activities 9,819 733 0.094 0.064 0.112
   Sources: Estonian Business Registry database; and authors' calculations.
   Note: Financial constraints are calculated based on equation (3).
Number of observations Financing constraints













Financial constraints 1.000 ... ... ... ...
Value added -0.411 1.000 ... ... ...
Value added/worker -0.477 0.387 1.000 ... ...
Labor productivity -0.879 0.327 0.428 1.000 ...
TFP -0.840 0.074 0.396 0.659 1.000
   Sources: Estonian Business Registry database; and authors' calculations.
   Notes: The Spearman rank correlations are based on the industry means to abstract from industry specific 
  effects. Financial constraints are calculated based on equation (3). Labor productivity is measured as real
  sales per worker. Other variable definitions are in Appendix A.
Table 6. Correlation Between Financial Constraints and Other Firm Characteristics
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Labor productivity OLS Levinsohn/Petrin
Age -0.149*** -0.141*** -0.113***
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007]
Size 0.234*** 0.114*** 0.353***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Capital intensity 0.115*** ... ...
[0.004]
Financing constraints -0.040*** -0.098*** -0.159***
[0.012] [0.012] [0.014]
Foreign dummy 0.271*** 0.312*** 0.253***
[0.014] [0.016] [0.014]
Number of observations 35,429 35,429 35,429
R-squared 0.458 0.504 0.757
   Sources: Estonian Business Registry database; and authors' calculations.
   Notes: The dependent variable is the log form of either labor productivity (Column 1), TFP 
   estimated using OLS (Column 2), or TFP estimated using the Levinsohn-Petrin methodology 
   (Column 3). Equation (5) is estimated using OLS, and we use bootstrapping methods to obtain 
   correct standard errors (1000 replications). Though not reported, all regressions include 2-digit
   industry dummies and time dummies. Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Capital
   intensity is the ratio of capital over the number of employees. Other variable definitions are in 
   Appendix A.
Table 7. Results for the Two-step Approach
 








Agriculture 1,825 -0.02 -0.051*** -0.072***
[0.016] [0.015] [0.015]
Mining  and quarrying 189 -0.049 -0.014 0
[0.060] [0.061] [0.059]
Manufacturing 7,798 -0.102 -0.199 -0.247*
[0.142] [0.156] [0.143]
Electricity, gas, and water supply 196 -0.168** -0.171** -0.190***
[0.080] [0.087] [0.072]
Construction 3,756 -0.189** -0.337*** -0.385***
[0.087] [0.116] [0.126]
Wholesale and retail trade 12,714 -0.095 -0.192 -0.157
[0.132] [0.153] [0.119]
Hotels and restaurants 1,782 -0.067** -0.076*** -0.149***
[0.026] [0.028] [0.030]
Transport and communication 3,201 -0.114 -0.248 -0.196
[0.409] [0.554] [0.425]
Renting of machinery and computer activities 758 -0.347*** -0.471*** -0.400***
[0.118] [0.133] [0.106]
R&D and other business activities 3,210 -1.191*** -1.564*** -1.281***
[0.267] [0.290] [0.261]
   Sources: Estonian Business Registry database; and authors' calculations.
   Notes: The dependent variable is the log form of either labor productivity (Column 1), TFP estimated 
   using OLS (Column 2), or TFP estimated using the Levinsohn-Petrin methodology (Column 3). 
   Equation (5) is estimated for each 1-digit industry separately using OLS. To keep a clear overview 
   we report only the coefficients on the financing constraints measure. We use bootstrapping 
   methods (1000 replications) to obtain correct standard errors (reported in brackets), with 
   significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 8. Results for the Two-step Approach, by Industry
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Number of 
observations
Labor Capital Age Score
Agriculture 1,825 0.505*** 0.335*** -0.019*** 0.008
[0.042] 0.070] [0.010] [0.018]
Mining  and quarrying 189 0.340*** 0.322*** 0.031 0.059
[0.135] 0.127] [0.050] [0.068]
Manufacturing 7,798 0.586*** 0.051*** -0.014*** 0.018
[0.017] 0.026] [0.005] [0.124]
Electricity, gas, and water supply 196 0.481*** 0.203 -0.003 -0.001
[0.110] 0.188] [0.027] [0.135]
Construction 3,756 0.643*** 0.190*** -0.024*** -0.299*
[0.030] 0.035] [0.006] [0.156]
Wholesale and retail trade 12,714 0.520*** -0.022*** -0.012*** 0.05
[0.017] 0.011] [0.003] [0.120]
Hotels and restaurants 1,782 0.720*** 0.039 -0.035*** -0.009
[0.043] 0.090] V0.007] [0.023]
Transport and communication 3,201 0.567*** 0.214*** -0.061*** 0.336
[0.035] 0.053] [0.013] [0.410]
Renting of machinery and computer activities 758 0.746*** 0.138 -0.040*** -0.208
[0.054] 0.129] [0.015] [0.472]
R&D and other business activities 3,210 0.726*** 0.106*** -0.036*** -0.965***
[0.027] 0.035] [0.012] [0.308]
   Sources: Estonian Business Registry database; and authors' calculations.
   Notes: Financing constraints are directly included in the TFP estimation as an additional state 
   variable. The dependent variable of Equation (6) is the log form of real value added, and we use 
   bootstrapping methods (1000 replications) to obtain correct standard errors (reported in brackets). 
   The structural approach is estimated for each 1-digit industry separately. R-squared statistics 
   are not available for the modified Levinsohn-Petrin estimation. Though not reported, all regressions 
   include 2-digit industry dummies and time dummies. Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
   p<0.1. Variable definitions are in Appendix A.
Table 9. Results for the Structural Approach, by Industry









( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )
Agriculture -0.023 0.006 -0.059 0.009 0.012
[0.051] [0.022] [0.618] [0.021] [0.026]
Mining and quarrying -0.037 -0.122 -0.067 0.046 ...
[0.570] [0.104] [0.066] [0.093]
Manufacturing 0.233 -0.103 -0.458*** 0.053 0.041
[0.633] [0.226] [0.228] [0.111] [0.105]
Electricity, gas and water supply ... 0.157 -0.035 0.131 0.041
[0.178] [0.068] [0.182] [0.234]
Construction -1.222*** -0.281 -0.304 -0.355 -0.282***
[0.579] [0.188] [0.196] [0.227] [0.104]
Wholesale and retail trade 0.940 -0.084 0.118 0.046 0.199
[0.728] [0.110] [0.585] [0.129] [0.121]
Hotels and restaurants 0.039 0.004 -0.034 -0.017 -0.442
[0.203] [0.052] [0.030] [0.065] [0.500]
Transport and communication 2.188 0.132 -1.263 0.272 -0.188
[2.599] [0.500] [0.908] [0.308] [0.130]
Renting of machinery and computer -3.281 1.339 -0.351 -0.865 -1.029
[6.734] [40.992] [0.338] [0.587] [0.664]
R&D and other business activities -0.319 -1.010*** -1.523*** -1.373*** -0.471***
[1.298] [0.491] [0.652] [0.355] [0.169]
   Sources: Estonian Business Registry database; and authors' calculations.
   Notes: Financing constraints are directly included in the TFP estimation as an additional state variable. The 
   dependent variable of Equation (6) is the log form of real value added, and we use bootstrapping methods 
   (1000 replications) to obtain correct standard errors (reported in brackets). The estimations are run for each 1-digit 
   industry separately. To keep a clear overview we report only the coefficients on the financing constraints measure. 
   For the regressions in the first four columns the financial constraints are calculated using the Euler-equation 
   methodology, while for the last column the financial constraints are estimated using a standard accelerator model 
   of investment. R-squared statistics are not available for the modified Levinsohn-Petrin estimation. Though not 
   reported, all regressions include 2-digit industry dummies and time dummies. Significance level: *** p<0.01, 
   ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 10. Robustness Checks
Sample splitting  33
Sources: Estonian Business Registry; and authors' calculations.
Figure 1. Size Distribution
















Sources: Estonian Business Registry database; and authors' calculations.
Figure 2. Entry and Exit Rates 
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Figure 3. Labor Productivity 
















Figure 4. Capital Intensity 




















Figure 5. Investment Ratio 














Sources: Estonian Business Registry database; and authors' calculations.
Sources: Estonian Business Registry database; and authors' calculations.
Sources: Estonian Business Registry database; and authors' calculations.
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Sources: Estonian Business Registry database; and authors' calculations.
1/ Financial constraints are calculated based on equation (3).
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Appendix A. Data sources and definitions 
The data used in this paper come from the Estonian Business Registry and cover the period 
1995-2005. Due to missing information on employment for the years 1995-1996, we use data 
only from 1997. In order to create our sample we follow three steps: 
1.  We construct a longitudinal panel using registration codes. Several corrections are made 
to take into account the change in registration codes: (1) firms that change registration 
codes because of the transfer from the Enterprise Registry to the Business Registry are 
considered the same firm; (2) in case of acquisitions, the acquiring and acquired firms are 
considered a unique firm for the whole sample period; the employment of the acquired 
firm is added to the employment of the acquiring firm; and (3) for all other transactions 
(mergers, breakup, and divesture), we treat firms involved before and after the transaction 
as different. 
2.  For 46 percent of the registered firms we have n o  d at a o n  th e v a ria b les u s ed  i n  th e  
analysis, or there is no clear information about the industry they belong to. These firms 
are excluded. 
3.  In addition, we exclude unrealistic observations for the variables used in the estimation. 
In particular, exclude individual observations where employment, capital, and 
intermediate inputs are zero or negative (23 firms). 
4.  During the analysis we noticed that some outliers were influencing to an important extent 
our results. After checking the data we realized that these outliers were probably the 
result of input mistakes, poor data quality, mergers and acquisitions, divestments, or 
revaluations of capital. Therefore we imposed 2 outlier rules to exclude observations with 
extreme values: (1) we deleted the top-five percentile observations of capital growth, (2) 
we deleted the top-one percentile observations of the cash stock-to-capital ratio. 
5.  We exclude the sectors with EMTAK 65 to 70 (Financial intermediation and Real estate 
activities) and EMTAK 75 to 99 (Public services). Firms in these sectors are not or less 
subject to financial constraints, or their investment behavior depends more on political 
decisions or economic policy rather than on access to external finance. 
6.  Additionally, state-owned firms are more likely to face soft budget constraints, and are 
not necessarily profit-maximizing agents. Since these characteristics may distort the 
analysis we decided to exclude the state-owned firms from our analysis (210 firms). 
7.  Finally, we do not observe a firm’s investment expenditure directly, but derive it from the 
law of motion of capital. As a consequence we cannot discern investment expenditure 
from the sales of capital goods; we only have a figure for the net investment of a firm. To 
minimize this problem we exclude observations with negative investment (5 percent of 
the observations). 
All variables used in this paper are in real terms. Sales, value added, and cash are deflated by 
output deflator; intermediate inputs are deflated by the intermediate inputs deflator; assets,   37
debt and investment are deflated with the gross capital formation price index. All deflators 
come from the system of national accounts provided by the Statistical Office of Estonia, and 
are available for 16 sectors (corresponding to the 1-digit ISIC Rev. 3.1). 
•  Sales (Salesit): net revenue received from the sale of products, goods and services; 
•  Labor (Lit): number of employees; 
•  Intermediate inputs (Mit): cost of goods, raw materials, and services purchased for core 
activities; 
•  Value added (Yit): net sales minus intermediate inputs; 
•  Capital (Kit): tangible and intangible fixed assets minus the goodwill, net of accumulated 
depreciation; 
•  Investment (Iit): calculated based on data on capital and depreciation, Iit = Kit – Kit-1 + Dit, 
where Dit stands for reported annual depreciation. Due to this calculation, we have no 
data on investment for the first year of a firm’s observation series; 
•  Cash stock (Cashit): sum of the cash stock and short term financial securities such as 
shares at the beginning of period t; 
•  Leverage (Leverageit): ratio long-term liabilities to total assets (net of accumulated 
depreciation) at the beginning of period t; 
•  Age (Ageit): age of the firm at the beginning of period t, based on the entry date in the 
Registry. 
•  Size (Sizeit): continuous measure of firm size, measured by total assets (net of 
accumulated depreciation) at the beginning of period t; 
•  Owner (Ownerit): either private, state, foreign or other. Shareholders with more than 10% 
of share capital of the firm shall be disclosed, and upon this information the Statistical 
Office of Estonia classified the ownership type. For example, a firm is labeled foreign if 
the sum of the foreign-owned shares surpasses 50 percent. 
•  Industry classification: Estonian EMTAK code (Classification of Economic Activities of 
Estonia).  
Table A.1 provides an overview of the industry classification used in Estonia. The total 
number of observations and the number of firms are listed in column 2 and 3.   38
Code Sector name Number of 
observations
Number of firms
1 Agriculture, hunting, and related service activities 3,138 880
2 Forestry, logging, and related service activities 1,722 595
5 Fishing, fish farming, and related service activities 509 140
10-14 Mining and quarrying 342 59
15-16 Manufacture of food products and beverages, and tobacco products 1,965 494
17 Manufacture of textiles 812 187
18-19 Manufacture of wearing apparel, tanning, dressing, and dyeing 1,969 469
20 Manufacture of wood and straw products, except furniture 3,687 1,014
21-22 Manufacture of pulp, paper, and publishing and printing 1,896 472
23-24 Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products, nuclear fuel, and chemicals 379 105
25 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 662 165
26 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 613 165
27-28 Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products 2,707 732
29 Manufacture of machinery and equipment not elsewhere classified 909 231
30-32 Manufacture of office and electrical machinery, computers, televisions, and radio transmitters 732 175
33 Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches, and clocks 526 114
35 Manufacture of transport equipment 442 131
36-37 Manufacture not elsewhere classified 2,047 556
40-41 Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply, and collection, purification, and distribution of water 550 147
45 Construction 11,001 3,428
50 Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles, and retail sale of automotive fuel 5,856 1,631
51 Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 14,720 4,561
52 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles, and repair of personal and household goods 16,260 4,449
55 Hotels and restaurants 5,296 1,560
60-62 Land, water, and air transport 6,680 1,917
63 Supporting and auxiliary transport activities, and activities of travel agencies 2,499 820
64 Post and telecommunications 368 125
65-67 Financial intermediation 416 197
70 Real estate activities 3,902 1,428
71 Renting of machinery and equipment without operator and of personal and household goods 821 307
72 Computer and related activities 1,592 530
73-74 Research and development, and other business activities 9,819 3,192
80 Public administration and defence, compulsory social security, and education 926 281
85 Health and social work 2,728 714
90 Sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation, and similar activities 395 115
92 Recreational, cultural, and sporting activities 1,264 425
91-93 Other service activities 1,630 516
Total 111,780 33,027
   Source: Estonian Business Registry database.
Table A.1. Industry Classification
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Appendix B. Euler-equation specification 
The derivation of the Euler model of investment follows closely Forbes (2007), Laeven 
(2003), Love (2003), and Harrison et al. (2004), all of which build on Bond and Meghir 
(1994). We refer to Love (2003) in specific for a more in-depth discussion of the Euler 
equation specification, and for proofs of the underlying derivations. 
To start, assume that each firm maximizes its present discounted value of current and future 
net cash flows, subject to the capital accumulation and external financing constraints. The 
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The first constraint (B.2) is the dividend paid to shareholders at the start of period t, the 
second constraint (B.3) is the capital stock accounting identity, and the third constraint (B.4) 
states that dividends (Dt) must be non-negative. П(Kt,ξt) is the restricted profit function (i.e. 
already maximized with respect to variable costs), with Kt the capital stock at time t and ξt 
being a productivity shock. C(It,Kt) is the adjustment cost function, It is investment 
expenditure, δ is the depreciation rate of capital, and βt+s-1 represents a discount factor. 
Financial frictions are introduced via a non-negativity constraint on dividends (B.4), and the 
multiplier for this constraint is denoted λt. This multiplier can be interpreted as the shadow 
cost associated with raising new equity, and implies that external financing is costly due to 
information or contracting costs. Rearranging the first-order conditions to the above 
maximization problem yields the Euler equation: 






















































δ β     (B.5) 
where  I C ∂ ∂  is the marginal adjustment cost of investment, and  K ∂ Π ∂  is the marginal 
profit of capital (i.e. the contribution of an extra unit of capital to the firm’s profits, referred 
to below as MPKt). In the Euler equation, the factor Θt = (1+λt+1/1+λt) is the relative shadow 
cost of external finance in period t+1 versus period t. In perfect capital markets applies 
(λt+1=λt=0). Thus, a firm is “financially constrained” if the shadow cost of external funds 
today is higher than tomorrow (1+λt+1/1+λt)<1.   40
In order to obtain an empirical model of investment allowing us to estimate equation (B.5), 
we need to parameterize the model. First, we proxy the (degree) of financing constraints Θt 
by the stock of liquid assets at the start of period t. Cash stock (or cash flow) has an intuitive 
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Next, if production follows a Cobb-Douglas production function, then MPKt can be 
measured as a sales-to-capital ratio: 
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⎛ + = θ θ        ( B . 7 )  
This representation allows for firm-fixed effects θi, and a ratio of capital’s share in 
production to the markups θ1,t. 
Also, assuming a quadratic adjustment cost function that is linearly homogenous in 








































     (B.8) 
where α1 and α2 are constants, αi is a firm-specific level of investment at which adjustment 
costs are minimized, and αt are time-specific effects. 
Finally, to simplify the estimation and interpretation of the coefficients, we linearize the 
Euler equation using a first-order Taylor approximation around the means. By assuming 
rational expectations and substituting equations (B.6), (B.7), and (B.8) into equation (B.5), 
the presence of financing constraints can be tested through the following empirical 
specification of the Euler equation: 
, 3 2
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1 0 it t i






























   (B.9) 
where αi captures firm-specific parameters in the adjustment cost function and the MPK, plus 
the average firm-specific level of financing constraints and the price of investment goods. δt 
denotes time dummies. A firm is considered to be more financially constrained if the cash 
coefficient, θ3, is estimated to be more positive. 
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Appendix C. Estimating Total Factor Productivity 
Although a full description of TFP estimation based on Olley and Pakes (1996) and 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) is beyond the scope of this paper, the steps implemented are 
briefly outlined below. 
We assume that firms maximize the expected value of both current and future profits from a 
Cobb-Douglas production function under uncertainty: 
, 0 it it it k it l it k l y ε ω β β β + + + + =      (C.1) 
where i and t indicate firm and time respectively. yit represents the natural logarithm of value 
added, lit and kit stand for the logs of labor and capital respectively. The firm specific error 
term consists of two parts: the firm productivity ωit which is observed by the firm but not by 
the econometrician, and εit are unpredictable zero-mean shocks to productivity after inputs 
are chosen. This asymmetric information about ωit causes two biases in the OLS estimates: a 
simultaneity bias and a selection bias. To address these biases Olley and Pakes (1996) 
developed a semi-parametric approach in which they use capital and investment as a proxy 
for unobserved productivity. Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) suggest a modification of the 
Olley-Pakes approach by using intermediate inputs (raw materials, electricity or fuels) 
instead of investment. The Levinsohn-Petrin algorithm largely follows the Olley-Pakes 
approach, so we simply substitute intermediate inputs for investment in the first stage. 
The timing of decisions of firm i in industry j in year t is as follows. A firm initially observes 
its productivity ωit, which is assumed to evolve according to an exogenous Markov process. 
Then the firm decides whether to exit or not, it chooses the input variables labor and 
materials, and how much to invest in capital. A firm’s input demand function depends on 
capital and on privately known productivity mit = mit(kit,ωit). Assuming that mit is strictly 
increasing in ωit (monotonicity condition), we can invert the materials’ demand function to 
obtain an expression for productivity depending on observable variables: 
( ) ( ). , ,
1
it it t it it t it k m k m m φ ω = =
−       (C.2) 
Substituting (C.2) into (C.1) yields the first stage of the estimation procedure 
( ) , , it it it t it l it k m l y ε λ β + + =       (C.3) 
where 
() ( ). , , 0 it it t it k it it t k m k k m φ β β λ + + =        
The functional form of λt is not known, but can be approximated by a third-order polynomial 
series in mit and kit.
36 The estimation of the partially linear model in (C.3) yields consistent 
                                                       
36  The partially linear model in (10) can be estimated using OLS with a polynomial expansion in mit and kit to 
approximate for the unknown function φt(.), or using kernel estimators. The former approach not only has the 
advantage of being easier and faster to implement, Pakes and Olley (1995) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)   42
estimates for the labor coefficient. Since kit is collinear with the non-parametric function, we 
can not identify βk. In order to consistently estimate the capital coefficient, the effect of 
capital on output still needs to be separated from its effect on a plant’s materials demand. 
Since Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) do not incorporate the survival probability, we follow 
Olley-Pakes’ approach for the second stage. The probability that a firm exits from the sample 
is determined by the probability that the end-of-period productivity falls below an exit 
threshold. We generate an estimate of the survival probability by running a probit regression 
on the same third-order polynomial defined as before; the estimated survival probability is 
denoted by Пit. 
The final step is to estimate βk from the resulting equation: 
( ) , ˆ , ˆ
1 1 1 it it k t it it k it l it k g k l y η β λ β β + − Π + = − − − −       
where  l β ˆ  is the estimate for  l β  out of the first stage, and g(.) is approximated by a 
third-order polynomial expansion of Пit-1 and ( ) 1 1 ˆ
− − − it k t k β λ , where  1 ˆ
− t λ  are the fitted 
values from the first stage. Since capital enters both in contemporaneous and lagged values, 
the third stage has to be estimated using non-linear least squares. Ignoring this structure, i.e. 
not restricting the coefficients on capital to be the same wherever it appears in the estimation 
of the second stage, would not yield efficient estimates.
                                                                                                                                                                      
report that the results of both approaches are very similar.   43
Code Emtak industry classification
Labor Capital Log(TFP) Labor Capital Log(TFP)
1 Agriculture, hunting and related service activities 0.592 0.308 7.632 0.441 0.224 9.111
2F o r e s t r y, logging and related service activities 0.643 0.399 7.205 0.399 0.480 6.517
5 Fishing, fish farming and related service activities 0.940 0.332 6.969 0.698 0.444 5.978
10 Mining and quarrying 0.591 0.442 6.835 0.365 0.296 9.639
15 Manufacture of food products and beverages, and tobacco products 0.810 0.295 7.938 0.468 0.246 9.496
17 Manufacture of textiles 0.774 0.263 8.639 0.567 0.168 10.345
19 Manufacture of wearing apparel, and tanning, dressing and dyeing 0.842 0.206 9.108 0.735 0.067 11.067
20 Manufacture of wood and straw products, except furniture 0.783 0.283 8.208 0.441 0.295 8.790
22 Manufacture of pulp, paper; publishing and printing 0.788 0.251 9.311 0.512 0.115 11.570
24 Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products, nuclear fuel, and 
chemicals
0.779 0.329 8.203 0.385 -0.072 14.583
25 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 0.910 0.195 9.680 0.677 0.157 10.745
26 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 0.856 0.307 7.968 0.542 0.310 8.647
28 Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products 0.791 0.265 8.855 0.537 0.136 11.044
29 Manufacture of machinery and equipment, not elsewhere classified 0.669 0.299 8.720 0.448 0.177 10.753
32 Manufacture of office and electrical machinery, computers, televisions 
and radio transmitters
0.797 0.260 9.039 0.654 0.081 11.660
33 Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and 
clocks
0.814 0.216 9.715 0.542 0.282 9.425
35 Manufacture of transport equipment 0.811 0.192 9.857 0.648 0.168 10.589
36 Manufacture, not elsewhere classified 0.808 0.268 8.500 0.440 0.296 8.977
40 Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply, and collection, purification 
and distribution of water
0.821 0.259 8.582 0.538 0.259 9.228
45 Construction 0.836 0.260 8.651 0.637 0.242 9.256
50 Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles, and 
retail sale of automotive fuel
0.987 0.229 8.839 0.528 0.163 10.394
51 Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles
0.818 0.256 9.410 0.416 0.149 11.308
52 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles, and repair of 
personal and household goods
0.896 0.206 9.154 0.468 0.110 11.004
55 Hotels and restaurants 1.003 0.169 9.070 0.616 0.187 9.615
62 Land, water and air transport 0.630 0.419 7.122 0.476 0.269 9.381
63 Supporting and auxiliary transport activities, and activities of travel 
agencies
0.861 0.258 9.333 0.715 0.225 10.003
64 Post and telecommunications 0.817 0.315 8.443 0.546 0.207 10.284
71 Renting of machinery and equipment without operator and of personal 
and household goods
0.726 0.431 6.838 0.481 0.324 8.560
72 Computer and related activities 0.969 0.287 8.735 0.851 0.152 10.456
74 Research and development, and other business activities 0.836 0.255 9.115 0.714 0.145 10.567
   Sources: Estonian Business Registry database; and authors' calculations.
Table C.1. TFP Estimation
Levinsohn/Petrin OLS  44
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